Predictions

Jerome Powell out from Fed Board by December 31?

Agents are fundamentally split: low-end agents (32-45%) overweight unprecedented political dynamics and DOJ backfire narrative; high-end agents (68-72%) appropriately weight the strong historical base rate but may underweight genuine uncertainty. The ensemble mean of 56% is an artifact of averaging divergent views rather than a consensus estimate. The median (61.5%) is more informative. I pull toward market price because: (1)...

Pedro Sánchez out as PM of Spain by December 31, 2026?

Seven of eight informed agents cluster tightly at 18-28% (mean ~23%), with the 50% outlier having failed research. The structural case for NO is strong: no viable no-confidence path exists, Sánchez has stated intent to serve until 2027, smaller parties have no incentive to trigger elections they'd lose, and even snap elections leave him as caretaker PM. While corruption scandals...

Will Bitcoin reach $100k by end of 2026?

Strong evidence for YES Regulatory risk

Will the Democratic Party win the TN-06 House seat?

All 8 agents agree this is an extremely safe Republican seat with probability ranging 1-7%. The six most evidence-grounded agents cluster at 1-3%. The district's R+17 PVI and 36-point margin in 2024 make a Democratic win virtually impossible under any plausible scenario. Even the strongest Democratic wave in modern history (2018) saw no district this red become competitive. The market...

Will the Republican Party win the MO-07 House seat?

All 8 agents agree this is one of the safest Republican seats in the country, with estimates ranging from 93-98% (extremely tight range, std dev only 1.8%). The evidence is overwhelming and consistent across all agents: R+21 Cook PVI, Solid R rating from all major forecasters, 71.6% win margin in 2024, 60+ years of unbroken GOP control, incumbent running for...

Will the Republicans win the Wyoming Senate race in 2026?

All 8 agents are in strong consensus, ranging from 93-97% with a mean of 95.4% and very low standard deviation (1.3%). Every agent identified the same core evidence: 50-year Republican winning streak, extreme partisan lean (R+25-40), Hageman as strong frontrunner with Trump endorsement, Cook Solid R rating, no credible opposition. The only disagreements are minor calibration differences around how much...

Will the Democratic Party win the IL-01 House seat?

All 8 agents are in near-perfect consensus (96-99%, mean 97.25%) that Democrats will win IL-01. The evidence is overwhelming and consistent: 90+ years of continuous Democratic control, D+18 PVI, 32-point margin in 2024, Solid D rating, majority-minority urban district in Chicago's South Side. No agent found any credible threat. The only downside risks mentioned are extreme tail events (death, scandal,...

Will the Democratic Party win the TN-06 House seat?

All 8 agents agree this is an extremely safe Republican seat with probability ranging 1-7%. The six most evidence-grounded agents cluster at 1-3%. The district's R+17 PVI and 36-point margin in 2024 make a Democratic win virtually impossible under any plausible scenario. Even the strongest Democratic wave in modern history (2018) saw no district this red become competitive. The market...

Will the Republican Party win the MO-07 House seat?

All 8 agents agree this is one of the safest Republican seats in the country, with estimates ranging from 93-98% (extremely tight range, std dev only 1.8%). The evidence is overwhelming and consistent across all agents: R+21 Cook PVI, Solid R rating from all major forecasters, 71.6% win margin in 2024, 60+ years of unbroken GOP control, incumbent running for...

Will the Republicans win the Wyoming Senate race in 2026?

All 8 agents are in strong consensus, ranging from 93-97% with a mean of 95.4% and very low standard deviation (1.3%). Every agent identified the same core evidence: 50-year Republican winning streak, extreme partisan lean (R+25-40), Hageman as strong frontrunner with Trump endorsement, Cook Solid R rating, no credible opposition. The only disagreements are minor calibration differences around how much...

Another Canada election called by June 30?

Excluding the failed Agent 1 (50%), the remaining 7 agents cluster tightly between 15-22% with median 17%. The corrected ensemble mean (~17.7%) is extremely close to market price (16.5%), leaving no actionable edge. All agents agree on the key facts: explicit PM denial, functioning Parliament, viable non-election path to majority, and narrow time window. The 2021 Trudeau snap election backlash...

Cap on gambling loss deductions repealed before 2027?

Seven of eight agents estimate 12-32% (mean ~19%), with strong consensus on key facts: multiple failed attempts, active leadership opposition, $1.1B revenue barrier, 5-15% historical base rate, and no committee action on any repeal bill. The outlier (Agent 2 at 41%) relies on theoretical industry influence arguments contradicted by observed legislative failures. The market at 49% is dramatically overpriced relative...

Jerome Powell out from Fed Board by December 31?

Agents are fundamentally split: low-end agents (32-45%) overweight unprecedented political dynamics and DOJ backfire narrative; high-end agents (68-72%) appropriately weight the strong historical base rate but may underweight genuine uncertainty. The ensemble mean of 56% is an artifact of averaging divergent views rather than a consensus estimate. The median (61.5%) is more informative. I pull toward market price because: (1)...

Jerome Powell out from Fed Board by May 30?

Agents split into two camps: those weighting historical norms (62-68%) and those weighting unprecedented circumstances (15-40%). The strongest evidence comes from Agents 5, 6, 7, and 8 who identified specific, verifiable blockers: (1) Warsh not formally nominated as of Feb 27, (2) Sen. Tillis blocking confirmation, (3) Senate Democrats also blocking, (4) only 32% Kalshi odds of confirmation before May...

Pedro Sánchez out as PM of Spain by December 31, 2026?

Seven of eight informed agents cluster tightly at 18-28% (mean ~23%), with the 50% outlier having failed research. The structural case for NO is strong: no viable no-confidence path exists, Sánchez has stated intent to serve until 2027, smaller parties have no incentive to trigger elections they'd lose, and even snap elections leave him as caretaker PM. While corruption scandals...

Poilievre out as leader of Conservatives before 2027?

Six of seven substantive agents estimate 5-28%, with the strongest-evidence agents (3, 5, 6, 7) clustering at 5-18%. The key facts are verifiable and consistent: 87.4% leadership review win, no challenger, explicit refusal to resign, strong base support (+70 net favorability among CPC voters), and only 10 months remaining. The 67% historical base rate for defeated Conservative leaders departing is...

US recognizes Russian sovereignty over Ukraine before 2027?

All 8 agents agree this is unlikely, ranging 4-18% with median 13.5%. The strongest agents (7 at 4%, 5 at 6%) found the most concrete evidence: Trump's own recent actions (NDAA signing, sanctions extension) directly contradict recognition. The de facto vs de jure distinction is analytically decisive — Trump's proposals don't even propose what the market requires. The market at...

Will the UK designate the IRGC a terrorist organization by June 30?

All 8 agents agree on the core facts: (1) EU designated IRGC Jan 29, 2026, creating pressure; (2) UK government confirmed preparing NEW legislation but explicitly said it will NOT be fast-tracked; (3) No bill introduced as of late Feb 2026; (4) Existing Terrorism Act 2000 cannot accommodate state military organs; (5) UK already has FIRS enhanced tier as alternative....

US x Iran nuclear talks resume by March 31?

All 8 agents unanimously assign 99% probability. The event has already occurred: US-Iran nuclear talks resumed on February 6, 2026 in Oman, with a second round February 17-19 in Geneva and a third round scheduled for February 26-27. Official representatives (Iranian FM Araghchi, US envoy Witkoff) participated in nuclear-focused discussions. Multiple independent credible sources confirm this. The market is priced...

Will the Republican Party control the House after the 2026 Midterm elections?

All 7 agents converge tightly (12-16%, std dev 1.7%) on Republican House retention probability around 13-14%. This is one of the strongest consensus readings possible. The evidence is clear and mutually reinforcing: (1) historical base rates strongly favor the opposition party in midterms, (2) Republicans' narrow majority makes them structurally vulnerable, (3) the complementary Democratic market at 82% is consistent...

OG Anunoby: Points O/U 17.5

7 of 8 agents independently confirmed via multiple authoritative sources (ESPN, NBA.com, CBS Sports, Basketball-Reference, StatMuse, Sportsnet) that the game was played on February 4, 2026, and OG Anunoby scored 20 points. The detailed stat line (7-17 FG, 4-9 3PT, 2-2 FT, 47-48 minutes in a double-overtime game) is consistent across all sources. Agent 5 (gpt-5.2) was the sole outlier...

Will Abdul El-Sayed win the 2026 Michigan Democratic Primary?

All 8 agents converge tightly (15-22%, std dev 0.021) on El-Sayed being an underdog in 3rd place. The evidence is specific and verifiable: Emerson poll shows him at 16% vs McMorrow 22%, he has the weakest general election numbers, progressive vote is split with McMorrow, and he lost his only prior statewide primary by 22 points. Sanders endorsement and 38%...

Will Brad Raffensperger win the 2026 Georgia Governor Republican primary election?

All 8 agents converge on a probability well below the market price of 17.5%, with a tight range of 4-14% and mean of 10.1%. This is strong consensus. The evidence is specific, recent, and verifiable: multiple February 2026 polls consistently show Raffensperger at 8-10%, a declining trajectory from 15% in November 2025. He faces structural headwinds - 73-74% Trump-aligned electorate,...

Will Charity Clark win the 2026 Vermont Governor Democratic primary election?

7 of 8 agents with substantive research converge on 25-32% (excluding the broken Agent 1 at 50% and outlier Agent 8 at 13%). The consensus view is clear: Clark faces a chain of contingencies - Scott must not run (~30%), she must enter (~75%), and she must win the primary (~55%). Agents uniformly identified the same key evidence: no declaration,...

Will Choo Mi-ae win the 2026 Gyeonggi Province Gubernatorial Election?

Six of eight agents estimate 42-53%, with only Agent 2 at 68% pulling the mean up. The core question is the DPK primary, where polling is genuinely mixed but Kim leads in more polls. Decomposing: ~50% primary win × ~87% general election win ≈ 43-48%. The market at 58% appears to over-weight Choo's momentum from a single February poll while...

Will Christian Estrosi win the 2026 Nice mayoral election?

All 8 agents converge on Estrosi being the underdog despite incumbency. The critical evidence is not just the 10-point polling deficit but the 42% base defection rate — this is not a normal incumbency challenge where historical base rates apply. Agents 4 and 5 provided the strongest evidence by identifying Chesnel-Le Roux's explicit refusal to withdraw (making triangulaire likely, which...

Will Civil Contract win the most seats in the 2026 Armenian National Assembly election?

Agents split into two camps: structural optimists (78-82%) emphasizing fragmented opposition and bonus seat mechanism, and cautious pessimists (62-68%) emphasizing low approval and Karapetyan surge. The structural argument is stronger for this specific question (most seats, not majority). However, the edge vs market price (74%) is minimal. The 62% agents over-weight head-to-head polls irrelevant to a multi-party proportional election. The...

Will Cory Booker announce a Presidential run before 2027?

All 8 agents converge on a low probability (4-12%, mean 7.4%) with strong agreement on the key structural barriers: (1) Booker's 2026 Senate reelection makes a pre-November announcement politically untenable, (2) the effective window narrows to ~8 weeks post-election in Nov-Dec 2026, (3) historical base rates strongly favor 2027 announcements, (4) no Democrat has announced for 2028 yet, eliminating first-mover...

Will Dave Bronson advance from the 2026 Alaska Governor primary election?

Agents split 42-68% range with most clustering 50-57%. The strongest evidence comes from Agents 2, 3, 4, and 6 who found specific polling and fundraising data. The Lake Research poll (Begich internal) showing Bronson at 13% in 3rd place is the best available data point and suggests he's competitive for top 4. However, his 7th-place fundraising among Republicans, terrible approval...

Will Flavio Bolsonaro qualify for Brazil's presidential runoff?

All 8 agents agree on the fundamental picture: Flavio is firmly in 2nd place with a massive gap over 3rd place, Tarcísio withdrew, and historical patterns favor a PT vs. right-wing runoff. Agent 3 is the outlier at 58% but even they acknowledge Flavio's strong polling position - they just weight substitution risk higher. The 7 other agents cluster tightly...

Will Haley Stevens win the 2026 Michigan Democratic Primary?

Seven of eight agents with substantive research converge tightly around 18-27%, with six of seven clustering at 18-23%. Agent 7 (50%) had incomplete research and zero confidence, so it should be discarded entirely. Excluding that outlier, the adjusted mean is ~21.1% and median is ~20%. All agents found the same core evidence: McMorrow leads the latest poll (22% vs Stevens...

Will Jordan Bardella win the 2027 French presidential election?

All 8 agents converge tightly (26-34%) around the market price of 29.5%. The evidence is genuinely balanced: unprecedented polling strength for Bardella (first far-right candidate to lead all runoff matchups) vs. unbroken historical pattern (0/3 far-right wins) and well-documented unreliability of French polls 14+ months out. The Le Pen appeal verdict (July 7, 2026) is the single most important unknown...

Will Katie Porter advance from the 2026 California Governor primary election?

All 8 agents agree Porter is in a weak position: 4th place at 10%, declining trajectory, weak convention showing, and massive Democratic fragmentation. The range (18-32%) reflects different weightings of the undecided bloc and consolidation potential, not fundamental disagreement. Agent 2 (18%) made the strongest case with the declining trend evidence, while Agents 1 and 3 (32%) gave more weight...

Will Micah Lasher be the democratic nominee for NY-12?

Agents split into two camps: 62% (3 agents emphasizing Nadler endorsement power) and 48-52% (5 agents emphasizing fundraising gaps, crowded field uncertainty, and upset risk). The split reflects genuine uncertainty about whether endorsements or money matter more in a 9-candidate NYC primary with no polling. Historical base rates suggest 20-40% for any single non-incumbent candidate, making 55% already generous. The...

Will Park Heong-joon win the 2026 Busan Mayoral Election?

All 8 agents agree on the core facts: Park trails significantly in polls, the national environment is terrible for PPP, but Busan's conservative base and Chun's legal jeopardy provide a floor. The disagreement is only about magnitude (22-35% range, std dev 4.8%). My estimate of 28% aligns with the ensemble median of 29% and reflects that current polling and national...

Will Steve Hilton advance from the 2026 California Governor primary election?

All 8 agents agree on the core dynamics: Hilton leads one poll but trails in another, Democratic fragmentation helps Republicans, and the Hilton-Bianco split is the key variable. The ensemble mean of 57.8% vs market price of 53% suggests a ~5% edge, but this is borderline given: (1) conflicting polls create genuine uncertainty about Hilton's true position, (2) 3+ months...

Will the Democratic Party win the CA-16 House seat?

All 8 agents are in tight consensus (94-97%, mean 95.9%) that this is a near-certain Democratic hold. The evidence is overwhelming and consistent: D+23-26 PVI, Cook Solid D rating, incumbent Democrat running for reelection, 2024 general was all-Democrat (no Republican even advanced), Silicon Valley hasn't elected a Republican since the 1990s, and 2026 midterm under Republican president favors Democrats. The...

Will the Democratic Party win the FL-22 House seat?

All 8 agents agree on core fundamentals favoring Democrats (Solid D, incumbent running, midterm tailwind). The key divergence is how much weight to give redistricting risk, which Agent 6 uniquely identified. I'm pulling below the ensemble mean (77.9%) toward 72% to account for redistricting uncertainty, but staying well above market (56%) because: (1) Frankel is confirmed running, (2) Palm Beach...

Will the Democratic Party win the IL-17 House seat?

All 8 agents agree Democrats are strongly favored (range 66-92%, mean 82.4%). The evidence is specific, verifiable, and multi-layered: Cook 'Likely D' rating with ~95% historical accuracy, two-term incumbent with improving margins (52%→54.4%), D+3 PVI, opposition-party midterm advantage, weak GOP field locked in after filing deadline, and Kalshi at 93%. The market at 58% appears severely mispriced - to justify...

Will the Democratic Party win the MD-06 House seat?

Seven of eight agents produced substantive research (Agent 6/Gemini failed and should be excluded entirely, making the effective mean ~91.9% and median ~92%). The remaining seven agents show strong consensus on key facts: (1) Cook rates MD-06 Solid D, (2) Democrats have won 6+ consecutive cycles since 2012, (3) the competitive race is the Democratic primary not the general, (4)...

Will the Democratic Party win the ME-01 House seat?

Seven of eight agents converge tightly between 93-96%, with strong consensus on the key evidence: Solid D Cook rating, D+11 PVI, 100% Democratic hold rate since 2008, incumbent running for reelection, weak Republican field. Agent 1 (50%) experienced a complete research failure and produced a meaningless default estimate that should be entirely excluded. Excluding Agent 1, the ensemble mean is...

Will the Democratic Party win the UT-02 House seat?

Seven of eight agents converge strongly on 2-8% probability, with six agents at 2-3%. Agent 7 (50%) had a research failure and should be discarded entirely. The consensus is overwhelming and well-evidenced: under the new court-ordered Utah congressional map (upheld Feb 23, 2026), UT-02 is the successor to Blake Moore's old UT-01 covering northern Utah (Weber/Davis/Cache counties) with an R+38...

Will the Republican Party hold between 200 and 204 House seats after the 2026 midterm elections?

All 8 agents converge tightly on 11-13% (σ=0.008), matching the market price of 11%. The evidence is well-researched and consistent: Republicans hold ~218-220 seats, the 200-204 range requires a 14-18 seat loss, which is plausible but represents just one 5-seat bin in a wide distribution. The Cook floor of 202 seats supports this range as plausible, but Trump's low approval...

Will the Republican Party win the FL-18 House seat?

Seven of eight agents converge strongly on 93-96% probability. Agent 1 (50%) clearly failed its research (0 pages read) and should be discarded entirely. Excluding that outlier, the effective ensemble mean is ~94.6% with very tight agreement. The evidence is overwhelming and consistent across all functioning agents: R+14 PVI, 30-point victory margins, Solid R rating from Cook, 7 consecutive Republican...

Will the Republican Party win the PA-05 House seat?

Seven of eight agents converge strongly on a very low probability (3-8%), with only Agent 1 (Gemini) at 50% due to a research failure (0 pages read, 0 confidence). Excluding this outlier, the remaining 7 agents have a mean of ~4.9% and median of 4%. The evidence is overwhelming and consistent across all functioning agents: Cook PVI D+15, Solid D...

Will the Republican Party win the PA-13 House seat?

Seven of eight agents converge strongly at 93-97% (Agent 1 at 50% is clearly a failed research run with 0 confidence and should be discarded entirely). The remaining seven agents found identical evidence: R+23 PVI, Solid R rating from Cook, Joyce winning 74.2% in 2024, Trump endorsement, no credible Democratic challenger, deeply rural district with no urban centers. This is...

Will the Republican Party win the WV-02 House seat?

All 8 agents converge tightly on 94-99% probability (mean 96.5%, std dev 1.4%), representing near-perfect consensus. The evidence is overwhelming and consistent across all agents: R+30 PVI, 70.8% vote share in 2024, Solid R rating from Cook, no primary challenger, weak Democratic field. The only disagreements are minor calibration differences about how much tail risk to assign to black swan...

Will the Republicans win the New York governor race in 2026?

All 8 agents converge on the same conclusion with remarkable consistency (range 4-8%, std dev 1.3%). Every agent identified the same core evidence: Hochul's commanding 26-point polling lead, record-high favorability, Trump's deep unpopularity in NY, Stefanik's withdrawal leaving a weak GOP nominee, Cook's 'Solid D' rating, and structural Democratic advantages (2:1 registration, no GOP statewide win since 2006). This is...

2026 U.S. House Election: Republican Odds under 15% by March 31?

Two agents (2,5) failed research and should be excluded. Remaining 6 agents cluster 22-35% with effective mean ~30.3%. The critical finding is that Republican odds are already at ~18%, very close to the 15% threshold. However, the 4-hour sustained window requirement is a meaningful barrier, and the sibling market structure (under 10% at 3%, over 25% at 95%) strongly implies...

2026 U.S. Senate Election: Republican Odds over 75% by March 31?

Seven of eight agents converge tightly in the 3-7% range, with strong agreement on the key facts: (1) underlying Republican Senate odds are approximately 60-64% and declining from 68% a month ago, (2) a 11-15 point jump would be needed to reach 75%, (3) the political environment is trending against Republicans (Trump approval ~37-42%, ICE controversies, generic ballot D+4-6), (4)...